Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons Image
Restatement of the Law Third,

Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons

This work focuses on the major avenues of recovery for physical and emotional harm to persons. It revises coverage of intentional torts in the Restatement Second, Torts. 

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    Tentative Draft No. 4
    Tentative Draft No. 4
    254 pages, 2019, #1R3ITPTD4

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

     

    Project Status at a Glance             xiii

    Foreword            xv

    Reporters’ Memorandum              xxiii

     

     

    CHAPTER 1

     

    DEFINITIONS OF INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS; TRANSFERRED INTENT

     

    § 3. Battery: Definition of Offensive Contact          1

    a. The contact is offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity   1

    b. The actor’s primary purpose is that the contact will be highly offensive to

                       the other’s sense of dignity       6

    c. The Restatement Second Caveat concerning liability when the actor knows

                       that the contact will offend the plaintiff’s “abnormally acute” sense

                       of dignity    8

     

    CHAPTER 1

    Consent Provisions for Specific Intentional Torts to Persons

    (§§ 1, 4, 5, and 7)

    § 1. Battery: General Definition   23

    f. Requirement of absence of consent      23

    g. Fault as to absence of consent               25

    h. No liability for minor contacts that are clearly socially justifiable              25

     

    § 4. Purposeful Infliction of Bodily Harm  32

    e. Requirement of absence of consent      32

     

    § 5. Assault         32

    j. Requirement of absence of consent       32

     

    § 7. False Imprisonment: General Definition           34

    k. Requirement of absence of consent      34

     

     

     

    CHAPTER 2

    CONSENT

     

    Scope Note         41

    § 12. Categories of Consent That Preclude Liability             41

    a. History             42

    b. Categories of consent that preclude liability      42

    c. The significance of consent      42

    d. Problematic “implied consent” terminology       43

    e. Burden of proof           43

    f. Role of judge and jury  45

    g. Relationship between consent to an intentional tort and assumption

          of the risk of negligence          46

     

    § 13. Actual Consent: Definition and Conditions    50

    a. History             50

    b. Actual consent requires willingness       51

    c. Two forms of actual consent   52

    d. What must the person be willing to permit?       53

    e. Actual consent does not require communication of willingness to the actor          55

    f. Sexual conduct              56

    g. Actual consent includes additional requirements of scope, capacity,

                  absence of duress, and absence of substantial mistake       56

     

    § 14. Actual Consent: Scope Conditions    62

    a. History             63

    b. Actual consent extends to conduct that is not substantially different in

    nature from the conduct that the person is willing to permit            63

    c. Conditions upon actual consent             64

    d. Revocation of actual consent  66

    e. Actual consent ordinarily precludes recovery even if the conduct

                           consented to is a crime          67

    f. Actual consent does not preclude liability if the actor violates a

    protective statute            69

    g. Actual consent does not extend to past conduct              69

    h. Sexual conduct             70

     

    § 15. Actual Consent: Requirements of Capacity, Absence of Duress, and

                         Absence of Substantial Mistake            77

    a. History             78

    b. Incapacity to consent 78

    c. Substitute consent       80

    d. Duress caused by the actor       81

    e. Substantial mistakes known to actor or caused by actor’s

    fraud or misrepresentation           82

    f. Mistakes that do not vitiate actual consent        84

    g. Alternative legal remedies        85

    h. Sexual conduct             85

     

    § 16. Apparent and Presumed Consent      93

    a. History             93

    b. Distinguishing apparent and presumed consent from actual consent        93

    c. Apparent consent under Subsection (a) need not be based on the words or

    affirmative conduct of the plaintiff            96

    d. Presumed consent under Subsection (b)              97

    e. Medical treatment       101

    f. Participation in athletic and recreational activities           102

    g. Sexual conduct             104

     

    § 17. Emergency Doctrine             115

    a. History             115

    b. Rationale        115

    c. Scope               116

    d. Actor has no reason to believe plaintiff would not have consented           120

    e. Role of judge and jury 121

    f. Relationship to gratuitous rescue and gratuitous provision of medical care            121

    g. Relationship to “emergency doctrine” in judging an actor’s negligence   121

    h. Relationship to necessity defense          123

    i. Burden of proof             123

     

    § 18. Consent to Sexual Conduct 129

    a. History             129

    b. Relationship to other consent and battery provisions     129

    c. Actual consent: willingness, revocation, capacity, fraud, and duress         130

    d. Apparent and presumed consent            134

    e. Express unwillingness or “No means no.”           135

    f. Affirmative consent     137

     

     

    § 19. Medical Treatment Without Legally Effective Consent as Battery        151

    a. History             151

    b. Legally insufficient consent as a battery or as negligence?           151

    c. Consequences of treating inadequate consent as battery or as negligence.           153

     

     

     

    CHAPTER 3

    PRIVILEGES

     

    Scope Note         161

     

    TOPIC 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR PRIVILEGES

     

    § 20. General Principles for Privileges        164

    a. General principles        165

    b. Purpose of actor          165

    c. Triggering conditions  165

    d. Both necessity and proportionality are required               165

    e. Reasonableness in two senses 165

    f. Honest and reasonable beliefs 166

    g. Reasonable beliefs under the circumstances      166

    h. Reasonable vs. correct beliefs 167

    i. Apportionment when conduct exceeds privilege               168

    j. Effect of actor’s privilege on privilege of others 168

    k. Risk to innocent third parties    168

    l. Burden of proof             168

     

    TOPIC 3. DEFENSE OF ACTOR’S INTEREST IN POSSESSION OF

    LAND AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

    Scope Note         172

    § 30. Privilege to Defend Land or Personal Property from Intrusion               173

    a. History and scope        173

    b. Intrusion         173

    c. In order to prevent or terminate intrusion          174

    d. Persons privileged to defend property  175

    e. Intrusion is not privileged          175

    f. Effect of intruder’s or actor’s mistake regarding the

                     existence of a privilege 176

    g. Necessity of request by actor that other desist unless failure

                     to make request is justified         178

    h. Reasonable belief that intrusion is occurring or imminently will

     occur and can be prevented only by the means used          179

    i. Reasonableness of means used               182

    j. Effect of excessive force            183

    k. Use of force, assault, or confinement threatening death or serious

                   bodily harm         184

    l. Negligent exercise of privilege  185

    m. Role of judge and jury               186

    n. Burden of proof           186

     

    § 31. Privilege to Defend Land or Personal Property from Intrusion by

                              Use of a Mechanical Device              192

    a. History and scope        192

    b. Mechanical device       193

    c. Most cases of harm from mechanical devices are properly brought

                as negligence claims, not as intentional torts            193

    d. Not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm       195

    e. Harm to a third person              195

    f. Reasonableness of device         195

    g. Necessity of warning or customary use               197

    h. Role of judge and jury 197

     

    § 32. Scope of Privilege to Regain Possession of Land or Personal Property               199

    a. History             200

    b. Actor has no privilege to regain dispossessed land          200

    c. Rationale for narrow right to recapture personal property in

                    “fresh pursuit.” 201

    d. How possession was obtained by the other        201

    e. Actor’s right to possession of the personal property       203

    f. Preventing intrusion versus regaining possession              204

    g. Mistakes regarding the conditions justifying the privilege             204

    h. The actor reasonably believes that the other is about

                 to remove the property from the actor’s presence 205

    i. Paragraphs (4)-(7) should be applied consistent with § 30              207

    j. Judge and jury role        209

     

    § 33. Liability to Third Person for Unintentional Harm         211

    a. History and rationale  211

    b. Strict liability  212

     

    § 34. Privilege to Defend Third Person’s Land or Personal Property 213

    a. History and rationale  213

     

    Appendix A: Black Letter of Tentative Draft No. 4 215

    Appendix B: Other Relevant Black-Letter Text        223

    Tentative Draft No. 4 contains § 3 (Battery: Definition of Offensive Contact) and §§ 1, 4, 5, and 7 (Consent Provisions for Specific Intentional Torts to Persons) of Chapter 1, Definitions; §§ 12-19 of Chapter 2, Consent; § 20 of Chapter 3, Topic 1, General Principles for Privileges; and §§ 30-34 of Chapter 3, Topic 3, Defense of Actor’s Interest in Possession of Land and Personal Property. Except for §§ 17-19 of Chapter 2 and §§ 20 and 30-34 of Chapter 3, the draft was approved by the membership at the 2019 Annual Meeting, subject to the discussion at the Meeting and to the usual editorial prerogative. There was insufficient time to consider the remaining material. The approved material may be cited as representing the Institute’s position until the official text of the entire project is published.

    254 pages, 2019, #1R3ITPTD4E

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

     

    Project Status at a Glance             xiii

    Foreword            xv

    Reporters’ Memorandum              xxiii

     

     

    CHAPTER 1

     

    DEFINITIONS OF INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS; TRANSFERRED INTENT

     

    § 3. Battery: Definition of Offensive Contact          1

    a. The contact is offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity   1

    b. The actor’s primary purpose is that the contact will be highly offensive to

                       the other’s sense of dignity       6

    c. The Restatement Second Caveat concerning liability when the actor knows

                       that the contact will offend the plaintiff’s “abnormally acute” sense

                       of dignity    8

     

    CHAPTER 1

    Consent Provisions for Specific Intentional Torts to Persons

    (§§ 1, 4, 5, and 7)

    § 1. Battery: General Definition   23

    f. Requirement of absence of consent      23

    g. Fault as to absence of consent               25

    h. No liability for minor contacts that are clearly socially justifiable              25

     

    § 4. Purposeful Infliction of Bodily Harm  32

    e. Requirement of absence of consent      32

     

    § 5. Assault         32

    j. Requirement of absence of consent       32

     

    § 7. False Imprisonment: General Definition           34

    k. Requirement of absence of consent      34

     

     

     

    CHAPTER 2

    CONSENT

     

    Scope Note         41

    § 12. Categories of Consent That Preclude Liability             41

    a. History             42

    b. Categories of consent that preclude liability      42

    c. The significance of consent      42

    d. Problematic “implied consent” terminology       43

    e. Burden of proof           43

    f. Role of judge and jury  45

    g. Relationship between consent to an intentional tort and assumption

          of the risk of negligence          46

     

    § 13. Actual Consent: Definition and Conditions    50

    a. History             50

    b. Actual consent requires willingness       51

    c. Two forms of actual consent   52

    d. What must the person be willing to permit?       53

    e. Actual consent does not require communication of willingness to the actor          55

    f. Sexual conduct              56

    g. Actual consent includes additional requirements of scope, capacity,

                  absence of duress, and absence of substantial mistake       56

     

    § 14. Actual Consent: Scope Conditions    62

    a. History             63

    b. Actual consent extends to conduct that is not substantially different in

    nature from the conduct that the person is willing to permit            63

    c. Conditions upon actual consent             64

    d. Revocation of actual consent  66

    e. Actual consent ordinarily precludes recovery even if the conduct

                           consented to is a crime          67

    f. Actual consent does not preclude liability if the actor violates a

    protective statute            69

    g. Actual consent does not extend to past conduct              69

    h. Sexual conduct             70

     

    § 15. Actual Consent: Requirements of Capacity, Absence of Duress, and

                         Absence of Substantial Mistake            77

    a. History             78

    b. Incapacity to consent 78

    c. Substitute consent       80

    d. Duress caused by the actor       81

    e. Substantial mistakes known to actor or caused by actor’s

    fraud or misrepresentation           82

    f. Mistakes that do not vitiate actual consent        84

    g. Alternative legal remedies        85

    h. Sexual conduct             85

     

    § 16. Apparent and Presumed Consent      93

    a. History             93

    b. Distinguishing apparent and presumed consent from actual consent        93

    c. Apparent consent under Subsection (a) need not be based on the words or

    affirmative conduct of the plaintiff            96

    d. Presumed consent under Subsection (b)              97

    e. Medical treatment       101

    f. Participation in athletic and recreational activities           102

    g. Sexual conduct             104

     

    § 17. Emergency Doctrine             115

    a. History             115

    b. Rationale        115

    c. Scope               116

    d. Actor has no reason to believe plaintiff would not have consented           120

    e. Role of judge and jury 121

    f. Relationship to gratuitous rescue and gratuitous provision of medical care            121

    g. Relationship to “emergency doctrine” in judging an actor’s negligence   121

    h. Relationship to necessity defense          123

    i. Burden of proof             123

     

    § 18. Consent to Sexual Conduct 129

    a. History             129

    b. Relationship to other consent and battery provisions     129

    c. Actual consent: willingness, revocation, capacity, fraud, and duress         130

    d. Apparent and presumed consent            134

    e. Express unwillingness or “No means no.”           135

    f. Affirmative consent     137

     

     

    § 19. Medical Treatment Without Legally Effective Consent as Battery        151

    a. History             151

    b. Legally insufficient consent as a battery or as negligence?           151

    c. Consequences of treating inadequate consent as battery or as negligence.           153

     

     

     

    CHAPTER 3

    PRIVILEGES

     

    Scope Note         161

     

    TOPIC 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR PRIVILEGES

     

    § 20. General Principles for Privileges        164

    a. General principles        165

    b. Purpose of actor          165

    c. Triggering conditions  165

    d. Both necessity and proportionality are required               165

    e. Reasonableness in two senses 165

    f. Honest and reasonable beliefs 166

    g. Reasonable beliefs under the circumstances      166

    h. Reasonable vs. correct beliefs 167

    i. Apportionment when conduct exceeds privilege               168

    j. Effect of actor’s privilege on privilege of others 168

    k. Risk to innocent third parties    168

    l. Burden of proof             168

     

    TOPIC 3. DEFENSE OF ACTOR’S INTEREST IN POSSESSION OF

    LAND AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

    Scope Note         172

    § 30. Privilege to Defend Land or Personal Property from Intrusion               173

    a. History and scope        173

    b. Intrusion         173

    c. In order to prevent or terminate intrusion          174

    d. Persons privileged to defend property  175

    e. Intrusion is not privileged          175

    f. Effect of intruder’s or actor’s mistake regarding the

                     existence of a privilege 176

    g. Necessity of request by actor that other desist unless failure

                     to make request is justified         178

    h. Reasonable belief that intrusion is occurring or imminently will

     occur and can be prevented only by the means used          179

    i. Reasonableness of means used               182

    j. Effect of excessive force            183

    k. Use of force, assault, or confinement threatening death or serious

                   bodily harm         184

    l. Negligent exercise of privilege  185

    m. Role of judge and jury               186

    n. Burden of proof           186

     

    § 31. Privilege to Defend Land or Personal Property from Intrusion by

                              Use of a Mechanical Device              192

    a. History and scope        192

    b. Mechanical device       193

    c. Most cases of harm from mechanical devices are properly brought

                as negligence claims, not as intentional torts            193

    d. Not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm       195

    e. Harm to a third person              195

    f. Reasonableness of device         195

    g. Necessity of warning or customary use               197

    h. Role of judge and jury 197

     

    § 32. Scope of Privilege to Regain Possession of Land or Personal Property               199

    a. History             200

    b. Actor has no privilege to regain dispossessed land          200

    c. Rationale for narrow right to recapture personal property in

                    “fresh pursuit.” 201

    d. How possession was obtained by the other        201

    e. Actor’s right to possession of the personal property       203

    f. Preventing intrusion versus regaining possession              204

    g. Mistakes regarding the conditions justifying the privilege             204

    h. The actor reasonably believes that the other is about

                 to remove the property from the actor’s presence 205

    i. Paragraphs (4)-(7) should be applied consistent with § 30              207

    j. Judge and jury role        209

     

    § 33. Liability to Third Person for Unintentional Harm         211

    a. History and rationale  211

    b. Strict liability  212

     

    § 34. Privilege to Defend Third Person’s Land or Personal Property 213

    a. History and rationale  213

     

    Appendix A: Black Letter of Tentative Draft No. 4 215

    Appendix B: Other Relevant Black-Letter Text        223

    Tentative Draft No. 4 contains § 3 (Battery: Definition of Offensive Contact) and §§ 1, 4, 5, and 7 (Consent Provisions for Specific Intentional Torts to Persons) of Chapter 1, Definitions; §§ 12-19 of Chapter 2, Consent; § 20 of Chapter 3, Topic 1, General Principles for Privileges; and §§ 30-34 of Chapter 3, Topic 3, Defense of Actor’s Interest in Possession of Land and Personal Property. Except for §§ 17-19 of Chapter 2 and §§ 20 and 30-34 of Chapter 3, the draft was approved by the membership at the 2019 Annual Meeting, subject to the discussion at the Meeting and to the usual editorial prerogative. There was insufficient time to consider the remaining material. The approved material may be cited as representing the Institute’s position until the official text of the entire project is published.

     
  •  
    Tentative Draft No. 3
    Tentative Draft No. 3
    156 pages, 2018, #1R3ITPTD3

    Project Status at a Glance;  Foreword;  Reporters’ Memorandum;  CHAPTER 1 DEFINITIONS OF INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS; TRANSFERRED INTENT: § 7. False Imprisonment: General Definition, § 8. False Imprisonment: What Constitutes a Confinement, § 9. False Imprisonment: Confinement by Assertion of Legal Authority, § 10. Participation in an Intentional Tort; Appendix A: Black Letter of Tentative Draft No. 3; Appendix B: Other Relevant Black-Letter Text

    Tentative Draft No. 3 contains §§ 7 – 10 of Chapter 1, Definitions of Intentional Torts to Persons: Transferred Intent. The draft was approved by the membership at the 2018 Annual Meeting (except for § 7(d) and Comment k, for which approval was not yet sought), subject to the discussion at the Meeting and the usual editorial prerogative. The approved material may be cited as representing the Institute’s position until the official text of the entire project is published.

    156 pages, 2018, #1R3ITPTD3E

    Project Status at a Glance;  Foreword;  Reporters’ Memorandum;  CHAPTER 1 DEFINITIONS OF INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS; TRANSFERRED INTENT: § 7. False Imprisonment: General Definition, § 8. False Imprisonment: What Constitutes a Confinement, § 9. False Imprisonment: Confinement by Assertion of Legal Authority, § 10. Participation in an Intentional Tort; Appendix A: Black Letter of Tentative Draft No. 3; Appendix B: Other Relevant Black-Letter Text

    Tentative Draft No. 3 contains §§ 7 – 10 of Chapter 1, Definitions of Intentional Torts to Persons: Transferred Intent. The draft was approved by the membership at the 2018 Annual Meeting (except for § 7(d) and Comment k, for which approval was not yet sought), subject to the discussion at the Meeting and the usual editorial prerogative. The approved material may be cited as representing the Institute’s position until the official text of the entire project is published.

     
  •  
    Tentative Draft No. 2
    154 pages, 2017, #1R3ITPTD2E

    Project Status at a Glance  xii

    Foreword  xiii

    Reporters’ Memorandum  xvii

    CHAPTER 1

    DEFINITIONS OF INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS; TRANSFERRED INTENT

    § 3. Battery: Definition of Offensive Contact  1

    a. The contact offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity  1

    b. The actor knows that the contact is highly offensive to the plaintiff  4

    c. “Purpose to offend” as an alternative to § 3(b)   8

    § 7. False Imprisonment  27

    a. History and nomenclature  27

    b. Rationales for liability for false imprisonment  27

    c. Intent to confine  28

    d. Transferred intent  29

    e. Comparison to negligence liability  30

    f. Liability for omission to release from confinement  30

    g. Awareness of confinement is ordinarily required  33

    h. Awareness of confinement not required if confinement causes bodily harm  33

    i. Factual cause and scope of liability  36

    j. Privileges to confine without the other’s consent  36

    k. Requirement of absence of consent  37

    l. Criminal false imprisonment and kidnapping compared  38

    m. Relationship to constitutional torts  38

    § 8. What Constitutes a Confinement  68

    a. History  68

    b. Confinement: general considerations  68

    c. Physical and temporal scope of confinement  69

    d. Alternative methods of confinement  70

    e. Confinement by actual or apparent physical barriers  71

    f. Confinement by physical force or physical restraint  72

    g. Confinement by threat of immediate physical force or of

                immediate physical restraint  73

    h. Confinement by causing duress  76

    i. Threats and forms of pressure that are not sufficient for confinement  77

    § 9. Confinement by Assertion of Legal Authority  101

    a. History  101

    b. Assertion of legal authority as a mode of confinement  101

    c. Relationship to “wrongful arrest” or “false arrest.”  102

    d. Rationales  103

    e. What constitutes an assertion of legal authority  103

    f. Submission to assertion of legal authority  105

    g. Plaintiff believes that he or she might have a duty to comply or

              fears adverse legal consequences  107

    h. Plaintiff need not believe that the actor has the legal authority

              that he or she asserts  108

    i. Overlap between § 8(b) and (c) and § 9  110

    j. Wrongful prosecution of criminal proceedings, wrongful use of civil

              proceedings, and abuse of process distinguished  111

    Appendix A: Black Letter of Tentative Draft No. 2  123

    Appendix B: Other Relevant Black-Letter Text  125

    Appendix C: Black-Letter Consent Sections from Preliminary Draft No. 4  129

    Tentative Draft No. 2 contains Chapter 1, Definitions of Intentional Torts to Persons: Transferred Intent. At the 2017 Annual Meeting, a motion to strike the knowledge provision in § 3(b)(i) passed, and the Reporters accepted a motion to add the words “sole or principal” before “purpose” in § 3(b)(ii) as a friendly amendment. The material in this draft will be submitted for approval at a future Annual Meeting.

     
  •  
    Tentative Draft No. 1
    Tentative Draft No. 1
    200 pages, 2015, #1R3ITPTD1

    Chapter 1 - Definitions of Intentional Torts to Persons; Transferred Intent
    § 101. Battery: General Definition [§ 101(d) of the black letter is for discussion only]
    § 102. Battery: Required Intent
    § 104. Purposeful Infliction of Bodily Harm [§ 104(b) of the black letter  is for discussion only]
    § 105. Assault [§ 105(c) of the black letter is for discussion only]
    § 106. Intentional (or Reckless) Infliction of Emotional Harm
    § 107. False Imprisonment
    § 110. Transferred Intent

    Chapter 2 - Consent
    § 111. Categories of Legally Effective Consent
    § 112. Actual Consent           
    § 113. Conditions that Render Actual Consent Ineffective
    § 114. Conditions that Limit the Scope of Actual Consent
    § 115. Apparent Consent
    § 116. Substitute Consent
    § 117. Implied-in-Law Consent [or “Constructive” Consent]
    § 118. Emergency Doctrine
    § 119. Consent to Medical Treatment

    Chapter 3 - Privileges
    § 120. Self-Defense and Defense of Others
    § 121. Privilege to Arrest or Detain
    § 122. Other Privileges

    Appendix: Black Letter of Tentative Draft No. 1

    This draft includes Chapter 1, Definitions of Intentional Torts to Persons: Transferred Intent, of which Sections 101-105;110 were submitted for approval. These sections, with the exceptions noted below, were approved by the membership at the 2015 Annual Meeting, subject to discussion at the meeting and to editorial prerogative. This approved material may be cited as representing the Institute’s position until the official text is published. The following was subject to discussion only and is not considered approved material: Chapter 1 § 101(d), and Comments f, g; § 104(b), and Comment d; and § 105(c), and Comment j

    200 pages, 2015, #1R3ITPTD1E

    Chapter 1 - Definitions of Intentional Torts to Persons; Transferred Intent
    § 101. Battery: General Definition [§ 101(d) of the black letter is for discussion only]
    § 102. Battery: Required Intent
    § 104. Purposeful Infliction of Bodily Harm [§ 104(b) of the black letter  is for discussion only]
    § 105. Assault [§ 105(c) of the black letter is for discussion only]
    § 106. Intentional (or Reckless) Infliction of Emotional Harm
    § 107. False Imprisonment
    § 110. Transferred Intent

    Chapter 2 - Consent
    § 111. Categories of Legally Effective Consent
    § 112. Actual Consent           
    § 113. Conditions that Render Actual Consent Ineffective
    § 114. Conditions that Limit the Scope of Actual Consent
    § 115. Apparent Consent
    § 116. Substitute Consent
    § 117. Implied-in-Law Consent [or “Constructive” Consent]
    § 118. Emergency Doctrine
    § 119. Consent to Medical Treatment

    Chapter 3 - Privileges
    § 120. Self-Defense and Defense of Others
    § 121. Privilege to Arrest or Detain
    § 122. Other Privileges

    Appendix: Black Letter of Tentative Draft No. 1

    This draft includes Chapter 1, Definitions of Intentional Torts to Persons: Transferred Intent, of which Sections 101-105 were submitted for approval. These sections, with the exceptions noted below, were approved by the membership at the 2015 Annual Meeting, subject to discussion at the meeting and to editorial prerogative. This approved material may be cited as representing the Institute’s position until the official text is published. The following was subject discussion only and is not considered approved material: Chapter 1 § 101(d), and Comments f, g; § 104(b), and Comment d; and § 105(c), and Comment j