The California Supreme Court recently reinstated a multimillion-dollar jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in a products-liability case based on a theory of failure to warn of the dangers of asbestos. In issuing its opinion, the court adopted the sophisticated-intermediary doctrine set out in the Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Products Liability and the Restatement of the Law Second, Torts.
In that case, Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc., the family of William B. Webb brought negligence and strict-liability claims against Special Electric Company, Inc., a business that had previously supplied asbestos-containing products to Mr. Webb’s employer. The plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Webb’s workplace exposure to the defendants’ products caused him to develop mesothelioma and ultimately led to his death.
A jury found the defendants liable for failure to warn and negligence, but the trial court granted the defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Court of Appeal reversed. Affirming and reinstating the jury verdict, the California Supreme Court held that JNOV was improper because the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial evidence.
The court extensively cited Torts 2d § 388, Comment n, and Torts 3d: Products Liability § 2, Comment i, in observing that, while suppliers of dangerous but legal products generally had to provide warnings to workers and consumers who might be exposed to the danger, a warning was not required when another in the chain of distribution was known to be aware of the danger and was trusted by the supplier to provide the warning. The court then stated, “[w]e have not previously addressed how the sophisticated intermediary doctrine applies in California. We now formally adopt the sophisticated intermediary doctrine as it has been expressed in the Restatement provisions just discussed.”
Applying the Restatement factors, the court concluded that, in this case, “the record [did] not establish as a matter of law that Special Electric discharged its duty to warn by reasonably relying on a sophisticated intermediary.” The court explained that the record did not demonstrate “that Special Electric actually and reasonably relied on [Webb’s employer] to warn end-users like William Webb about the dangers of asbestos,” and “the jury could have reasonably determined that any reliance on [Webb’s employer] would have been unjustified.” Consequently, the court held that jury’s verdict should not have been overturned.