The Supreme Court of Iowa adopted Restatement of the Law Third, Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 8.5, Comment c, for its definition of “probable cause” in the context of challenging the validity of a will containing a no-contest clause. In Matter of Estate of Felten, 28 N.W.3d 251 (Iowa 2025), the daughter of a testator challenged the testator’s will, arguing that her sister, who was the executor of the will, exercised undue influence to convince the testator, who suffered from mild dementia, to disinherit his other children. The executor counterclaimed for abuse of process, alleging that the will contest was brought in bad faith. After a jury returned a verdict in favor of the executor, the trial court overruled the daughter’s objection to the executor’s final report purporting to disinherit the other children based on the will’s no-contest clause, holding that the no-contest clause was enforceable because the daughter’s claim lacked good faith and probable cause to challenge the will. On appeal, both parties sought to clarify the meaning of “probable cause” in the probate context.
The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the findings of the trial court, adopting the definition of “probable cause” set forth in Restatement of the Law Third, Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 8.5, Comment c. Under § 8.5, Comment c, probable cause existed when, “at the time of instituting a proceeding to challenge a will, there was evidence that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that there was a substantial likelihood that the challenge would be successful.” Observing that Iowa law had not revisited the definition of “probable cause” in this context since 1950, when Iowa courts adopted the definition of “probable cause” set forth in Restatement of the Law, Torts § 675, the court explained that its new approach “maintain[ed] the menace of the no-contest clause, while simultaneously permitting good faith challengers with probable cause to litigate the validity of a will without disinheritance.”
The court then applied the factors for determining probable cause set forth in § 8.5, Comment c, to the instant case, holding that the daughter failed to meet her burden to show that she acted with good faith and probable cause in challenging the testator’s will, because she failed to present evidence supporting her belief that her challenge would be successful. The court explained that the record lacked critical evidence of examples of her pre-suit investigation, which would have revealed that the testator’s doctor had evaluated the testator shortly before he executed his final will and determined that he was mentally competent. Further, neither the daughter nor her counsel revealed what underlying facts the daughter shared, or what legal advice she received, before filing the will contest. Thus, concluded the court, the daughter lacked probable cause to bring her challenge, and the no-contest clause would be enforced to effectuate the testator’s intent.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of South Dakota adopted the premise set forth in Restatement of the Law Second, Torts § 164 that a mistake of law or fact regarding the ownership or possession of real property, however reasonable, did not absolve a trespasser of liability for trespass. In Coyle v. McFarland, 28 N.W.3d 128 (S.D. 2025), landowners sued their neighbors, alleging that a portion of the neighbors’ driveway and the vehicles that the neighbors parked on the driveway intruded on the landowners’ property and constituted a civil trespass. After the trial court denied the neighbors’ motion for a continuance to conduct discovery related to the legal determination of the boundaries of the lots and granted partial summary judgment to the landowners, the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed and remanded for further proceedings, agreeing with the landowners’ contention that the neighbors misunderstood the intent element of a civil trespass when they argued that their good-faith belief regarding the location of the property boundary would preclude a finding that they committed the intentional tort of trespass. The court adopted Restatement of the Law Second, Torts § 164 to hold that the neighbors’ mistaken belief as to the ownership of the property did not preclude a claim of trespass, so long as they intentionally entered or occupied the landowners’ property. The court reasoned that many jurisdictions, including the U.S. Supreme Court, applied the general principle in § 164 that acts could be deemed intentional for purposes of civil liability regardless of whether the actor knew that the conduct violated the law.